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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the issue of intelligence cooperation between NATO and 
Mediterranean non-member countries (Med).  The paper is divided into four parts: 
The first part examines the development of intelligence cooperation frameworks in 
Europe and the Mediterranean region; The second part analyses major problems and 
issues relating to NATO-Med intelligence cooperation; The third part examines 
NATO’s intelligence requirements in the Mediterranean, at four distinct phases in 
NATO-Med cooperation; The forth part explores policy options aimed at enhancing 
frameworks for NATO-Med intelligence cooperation. 
 
The paper argues that NATO policy in the Mediterranean region requires the 
development of institutionalised frameworks for intelligence cooperation with its 
Mediterranean neighbours.  NATO experience over the past decade, including the 
events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, present the Mediterranean as a potential 
area of extensive NATO operations in the future.  NATO intelligence structures, 
however, suffer from an ‘intelligence deficit’ over the Mediterranean.  Over four 
decades of Cold War, NATO intelligence structures concentrated on Eastern Europe, 
while the Mediterranean region was allocated only secondary importance in the 
collection and processing of information.  As a result, NATO often lacked intelligence 
information required for successful operations in the Mediterranean area.  This lack of 
information could be reduced by more effective cooperation with local intelligence 
services of non-member Mediterranean countries, including Israel, Egypt, Morocco, 
Cyprus and Malta.  This paper analyses the difficulties hindering NATO external 
intelligence cooperation and examines the alliance’s intelligence requirements in the 
  1Mediterranean.  It also explores policy options for the creation of intelligence 
cooperation frameworks aimed at enhancing NATO operations in the region. 
 
The paper concludes that, despite some progress being made following the Kosovo 
campaign, NATO still has a long way to go in creating and maintaining regular and 
effective frameworks for intelligence cooperation with Mediterranean countries.  Such 
frameworks could enhance NATO operations and European Union policy in this 
volatile region. They could also serve to stabilise regional security and encourage 
security cooperation among Mediterranean countries facing similar security threats. 
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  3 
1 Introduction 
 
As the World reels from the effects of the 11
th November terror attacks in the United 
States, intelligence cooperation is again perceived by many decision-makers as an 
essential element in the global fight against international terrorism.  Intelligence has 
gained in importance as means for collecting information critical for national and 
indeed global security.  The worldwide effects of the 11
th September attacks and the 
US-led coalition military action in Afghanistan significantly alter the intelligence 
requirements of western intelligence services.  As the primary western military 
alliance, NATO could stand at the forefront of the anti-terror campaign, especially if 
mass terror activities spread to Europe.  Intelligence cooperation with non-alliance 
countries must now be awarded a higher priority. 
 
Intelligence services and intelligence activities are inherently of a secret nature.   
Intelligence secrets have traditionally been highly classified on the national level, 
making the sharing of intelligence information not only an operational expedient but 
also often a foreign policy issue.  Indeed, intelligence cooperation has developed since 
WWII into an effective part of foreign policy, enabling countries with common 
security interests to share confidential information required for national security.   
Examples of the role of intelligence cooperation in overall bilateral relations between 
countries can be seen in the importance of the ‘special relations’ between the United 
States and Britain and in the intelligence relations during the Cold War between the 
Soviet Union and member states of the Warsaw Pact. 
 
  4In a world of complex technologies and communications, no single intelligence 
service can hope to achieve complete global coverage on a level required by political 
and security decision-makers.  As Michael Herman aptly notes “there is always more 
information potentially available than any agency can collect by itself”.
1  Even the 
intelligence services of the US, which enjoy the highest budgets in the world, are 
often forced to request the assistance of local intelligence services in different 
countries.  Intelligence services of numerous countries, even Western European ones, 
must often be content with covering their own region, fulfilling everyday political and 
security needs.  For extensive information on other regions, which could arise due to a 
crisis or involvement in multilateral security operations, they are dependant to an 
extent on cooperation with larger services or with those located in the required region.  
Such cooperation is, in most cases, conducted traditionally on a bilateral level. 
 
Two main interests motivate the need for increased intelligence cooperation.  The first 
is the spiralling cost of intelligence operations, the second is the ability of some 
services to operate better in certain regions or locations, often referred to as ‘country-
role specialisation’.  The cost of intelligence work has been greatly increased over the 
past four decades.  This element is especially evident in the field of Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT), which includes the technological monitoring of 
communications and satellite imagery.  Very few countries can afford to launch and 
maintain intelligence satellites
2.  Few can also afford communication-monitoring 
stations scattered around the globe.  By cooperating and sharing resources, less-
funded services enjoy access to expensive facilities and capabilities without 
impossible financial burdens or loss of authority.  Indeed, Becher notes that the joint 
  5usage of intelligence resources enhances capacities without having to change national 
structures or responsibilities
3. 
 
Country-role specialisation refers to the ability of certain intelligence services to 
achieve high capabilities in their own region or over specific issues.  In essence, 
smaller intelligence services can ‘specialise’, either geographically or topically, and 
achieve exceptional coverage unmatched by the larger services that aim for global 
coverage.  Especially in the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), the running of 
agents requires linguistic and cultural skills that are difficult to train externally.  Often 
only native-born people could carry out certain intelligence missions, making it easier 
for services in that region to operate well on the ground where US or European 
services could not.  Country-role specialisation is often the ‘currency’ that small 
intelligence services offer in exchange for cooperation with much larger and better-
equipped ones. 
 
With the possible exception of Israel and Turkey, the intelligence services of 
Mediterranean countries cannot afford extensive global coverage.  Some even lack 
regional signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.  Many of those smaller services, 
however, possess the capabilities to train and operate agents throughout the region in 
a better way than the US intelligence community or many of their European 
counterparts.  This paper examines how and when could NATO benefit through 
cooperation from the skills and capabilities of those potential Mediterranean partners. 
 
1.1 Intelligence  Framework 
 
  6For the purpose of this research, a ‘framework’ for intelligence cooperation is defined 
as an institutional set of working norms maintained over a longer period of time.  
While not a fully-fledged institution, a framework is a more flexible form of 
arrangement while maintaining its longevity and official status.  Different frameworks 
could include different components, adjusting for the intensity and cost of operation. 
Typical frameworks could include components such as regular periodical meetings, 
standardised means of communication, liaison personnel, dedicated facilities, joint 
planning, common training, common classification standards and accepted security 
clearances.  Longevity is an essential element of a framework, and therefore the 
definition of framework used here does not include ad hoc arrangements set up due to 
an impending contingency or crisis with the aim of dismantling them once that crisis 
is over. 
 
1.2  Methodology and Sources 
 
Intelligence cooperation is a highly sensitive and confidential part of government 
policy.  In order to overcome the problem of classification and the reluctance of 
officials to discuss matters relating to intelligence, the methodology adopted for this 
research was based on a twofold approach: open sources relating to past and present 
intelligence cooperation enabled critical examination of past efforts, while discussions 
with experts, former security officials and diplomats enabled analysis of problems and 
requirements for effective NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation.  These 
discussions also illuminated the perceptions held by different nations involved of such 
cooperation.  The interviews were conducted by the author on a non-attributable basis, 
since many of the interviewed persons were extremely reluctant to be named on this 
  7subject.  Discussions were conducted with experts from Greece, Turkey, Israel, 
Germany and Britain, as well as at NATO headquarters in Brussels. 
 
The issue of interviews became even more problematic after the September 2000 
outbreak of violence in Israel and the Palestinian Authority are, often referred to as 
the ‘El Aksa Intifada’.  Following this outbreak, many Arab countries broke off or 
scaled down their relations with Israel.  As a result, officials and experts from Arab 
countries were reluctant to discuss the issues relating to intelligence cooperation with 
the author. However, these countries are included in the research as potential NATO 
cooperation partners and in the policy options part as well. 
 
The situation changed further shortly after the completion of this research, following 
the 11
th September 2001 terror attacks in the US.  Intelligence cooperation, usually 
conducted in secret, was propelled to media highlights as a potential weapon in the 
global struggle against terrorism.  Although the core elements of this research are as 
applicable to counter-terrorist warfare as to interstate conflicts, the project was 
adapted to accommodate the recent global developments. 
 
1.3  National Intelligence and Multinational Cooperation 
 
One the main barriers to wider European intelligence cooperation is the fact that 
intelligence in Europe is conducted almost exclusively on the national level.  There is 
no centralized European organization that deals with intelligence on the EU level.  
The multiplicity of intelligence organizations and agencies not only make cooperation 
and liaison very difficult, but also assures that most cooperation efforts with non-
European countries remain on a bilateral basis. 
  8 
The idea of a European intelligence agency is not a new one.  As early as the 1960s, 
some NATO officials were pushing towards a more coordinated form of intelligence 
sharing in Europe. However, Cold War interests and differences of opinion between 
the U.S. and France prevented this idea from gaining any ground.  Following the end 
of the Cold War, several strategic thinkers concluded that Europe had to develop a 
unified form of intelligence mechanism. Klaus Becher identifies the importance of 
intelligence cooperation in multinational military operations and analysed intelligence 
cooperation within the WEU as a nascent European intelligence identity
4.  He lists 
four basic requirements for European intelligence integration: effective political and 
parliamentary controls; clear divisions between intelligence and law enforcement 
work; separation between foreign espionage and internal security; and a defined role 
for intelligence analysis in political decision-making.  Becher concluded that despite 
operational necessity and political goodwill, a clear political effort is required to 
advance the issue of intelligence cooperation on the European level.  However, 
despite problems relating to political control, information security and privacy, the 
EU could not afford to ignore this important capability.  
 
Alessandro Politi examines the necessity of a European intelligence policy.  He notes 
that intelligence is more important now than during the Cold War
5.  The change in 
threats for European security is accompanied by a change in intelligence 
requirements, which make much of the systems set up for Cold War intelligence 
collection outdated.  He also examines the political, economic and professional 
advantages such a policy could produce.  Frederic Oberson examines nascent 
European intelligence structures at the WEU, including the WEU Intelligence Section 
  9and the WEU Situation Centre
6.  He concludes that a higher priority must be given to 
reinforcing the mechanisms of intelligence exchange with NATO as a core element in 
expanding WEU intelligence capabilities.  When examining the development of the 
European intelligence satellite system HELIOS, Bernard Molard examines WEU 
intelligence policy as a complementary element to NATO and EU policies.  He 
concludes that the HELIOS system and the Satellite Centre, based at Torrejon in 
Spain, represent a first stage in establishing an independent European intelligence 
assessment capability.  He asserts that this expansion in European intelligence 
capabilities enhance NATO’s capacities, opening the way for a more active 
intelligence cooperation between NATO and the EU, beneficial to both
7. 
 
Over the past four decades, several multinational initiatives attempted to address the 
issue of intelligence cooperation on a wider level.  The following chapter examines 
the development of different frameworks of European and European-Mediterranean 
intelligence cooperation and analyses the motivating interests and characteristics of 
each framework. 
 
2 The Development of European-Mediterranean intelligence 
Cooperation 
 
Cooperation between European and Mediterranean intelligence services is not a new 
phenomenon.  As early as the 19
th Century, the Imperial German Intelligence service 
cooperated closely with its Egyptian and Ottoman counterparts over the politically 
sensitive visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II in Palestine in 1892
8.  However, such cooperation 
efforts were carried out in an ad hoc manner, aimed at solving pertinent and 
immediate problems and petered out once those problems were gone.  Only in the 
  101950s did major efforts at creating intelligence cooperation frameworks in the 
Mediterranean region get underway.  
 
This chapter examines the development of several intelligence cooperation 
frameworks in Europe and the Mediterranean regions which operated on a long-term 
institutional form.  Rather than present an exhaustive historical account, the chapter 
examines the salient features of each attempt at creating intelligence cooperation 
frameworks and analyses those features relevant to NATO’s intelligence relations 
with Mediterranean countries. 
 
Until the Second World War, the traditional domain of intelligence services was the 
collection of information abroad to assist policy-makers in conducting more effective 
policies
9.  Intelligence was viewed as an extension to a state’s sovereignty, which in 
other aspects was restricted by the geographical limits of that country.  The gathering 
of intelligence information by clandestine means, in those days more often referred to 
as espionage, was perceived as a legitimate function of rulers and governments as 
long as it remained secret.  Although many politicians openly maintained that 
intelligence was an un-gentlemanly practice more fitting to ‘other people’, such as 
Lord Grey’s immortal assertion that “Gentlemen do not read other people’s mail”, by 
the outbreak of the First World War most European countries developed 
institutionalised services for secretly collecting information abroad.  These services, 
and material produced by them, were held to be national secrets, protected by 
legislation from being passed onto any third party.  Information was exchanged 
between intelligence services from different countries on an ad hoc basis, often the 
product of personal relations between officials rather than co-ordinated policy. 
  11 
It was during the Second World War that the active exchange of secret information 
between intelligence services in Europe developed into institutionalised forms.  Due 
to early German successes in the war, many intelligence organisations from occupied 
countries escaped to London, where they developed extensive working relations with 
British intelligence.  When the United States entered the war in 1941, its intelligence 
chiefs quickly realised the potential for sharing secrets, and even funding other 
services’ operations.  Throughout the war, the intensive exchange of information 
eroded the notion that intelligence was strictly a non-shareable national asset, as the 
interests of services and countries converged on many issues
10. 
 
The Anglo-American wartime cooperation in the field of enemy communication 
interception later developed into one of the most important institutionalised forms of 
intelligence co-operation during the Cold War.  The UKUSA Treaty was signed by 
the United Kingdom and the United States (hence its name) in 1947.
11  Later on 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand became signatories of the treaty as well.   
UKUSA regulates with the exchange of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) - information 
obtained by technological means, i.e. through the interception of al forms of 
communications.   The Treaty divided the world into several sectors and each member 
state was made responsible for collecting SIGINT in its sector.  In practice, the 
Americans soon took over the running and funding of most of UKUSA’s operations, 
but the institutionalised arrangements such as assigning liaison officers, joint working 
groups and committees, remained multilateral.
12  The existence of UKUSA was 
strongly denied by its signatory states throughout the Cold War, setting a pattern for 
later intelligence co-operation forms to be totally kept out of the public eye. 
  12 
In his analysis of European police cooperation, John Benyon defines three interrelated 
levels of cooperation - the macro level, which is based on international agreements or 
treaties, the meso level, which is concerned with operational practices and procedures, 
and the micro level, which deals with individual investigations or actions over a 
specific case.
13  The same levels of analysis are relevant to the cooperation between 
intelligence services.  The macro level deals with multinational agreements set for the 
purpose of establishing existing or new frameworks for the multilateral exchange of 
information, or other forms of active cooperation, between intelligence services.
14  
The meso level encompasses the standardising of communication methods, reporting 
formats, regular periodical meetings at different levels and permanent liaison 
personnel.  The micro level refers to cooperation or the provision of information over 
a specific case, a situation which would often be decided upon on a lower level, ad-
hoc basis. 
 
When discussing institutionalised forms of intelligence cooperation it is important to 
distinguish their functional characteristics, which differ greatly from those of other, 
open international cooperation bodies.  Despite their often-dramatic names, these 
intelligence frameworks lack a permanent structure of their own, being dependent on 
the participating services to provide the necessary budgets, secretariat, facilities etc.  
Most organisations discussed here lacked a permanent staff or headquarters, due to 
the elements of secrecy and political risk involved, but their activities reached a high 
level of institutionalisation even without these centralised control positions.  Their 
main operational characteristics were standardised forms of communications, regular 
meetings and permanent liaison, making information of common interest available on 
  13a multilateral basis.  Due to the secrecy surrounding the activities of these frameworks 
it is hard to catalogue their exact development and modes of operation, but sufficient 
information enables overall trends and methods to be explored. 
 
The early years of the European integration process saw also the emergence of the 
first two post-WWII intelligence cooperation frameworks, NATO’s intelligence 
sharing mechanisms and TRIDENT. 
 
Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, mechanisms were developed for the 
exchange of information, mostly of a military nature, between member states.   
NATO’s Current Intelligence Group provided a forum for shared information to be 
disseminated among all member states.  It had the permanent staff and facilities to 
make information available to the smaller members, who did not possess the expertise 
or funds to develop sufficient intelligence collection efforts behind the Iron Curtain.  
But NATO’s political character, especially following France’s withdrawal from 
NATO’s military structures in 1965, diminished the importance and scope of 
multinational intelligence sharing within NATO.  This erosion was compounded by 
scandals of espionage and leaks in some smaller member states that were more on the 
receiving end of secrets from the larger NATO members.  Due to a growing 
reluctance on behalf of American intelligence agencies to share their secrets with all 
of NATO’s members, some of whom had strongly opposing interests, a practice 
developed whereas several informal “working groups”, each comprising 
representatives of several countries, would receive different levels of material on the 
basis of a “need-to-know”.  Through this informal arrangement the US, and to a lesser 
  14extent Britain, sought to keep NATO’s intelligence-sharing function alive while 
maintaining effective secrecy. 
 
The macro level of the NATO intelligence exchange mechanism was the North 
Atlantic Treaty and the NATO Council, which had the ultimate responsibility for the 
functioning of the treaty.  On the meso level standard communications were 
institutionalised, and regular meetings enabled the smooth flow of information.  On 
the macro level information could be provided by members in individual cases even 
when these cases concerned conflicts outside NATO’s area-of-operations, as defined 
by the NATO treaty.  One working example of this was information provided by the 
US and other NATO members to Britain during the Falklands War in 1982
15. 
 
2.1 Trident 
 
The second intelligence cooperation framework formed in the late 1950’s was 
TRIDENT, also known as the “Treaty of the Periphery”.
16  TRIDENT was initiated in 
1958 by the intelligence services of Israel, Turkey and Iran, and was later joined by 
Ethiopia.
17  Although not formally a European group, almost each of the TRIDENT 
members was supported or ‘sponsored’ to some extent by European and American 
intelligence services, which were driving force behind its operation. 
 
TRIDENT was based on the concept of ‘Periphery’ in the Middle East region.  This 
political concept maintained that Arab nationalism was the main threat or cause of 
instability in the region and should therefore bring together the non-Arab countries of 
the region into closer cooperation.  The aim of TRIDENT was to provide intelligence 
cooperation against the rising tide of Arab nationalism.  Britain, which two years 
  15previously had lost the Suez Canal to Egypt’s president Nasser in the disastrous Suez 
campaign, sought to maintain its influence and intelligence capabilities in the Middle 
East through TRIDENT.  The Turkish and Iranian intelligence services enjoyed close 
connections with the intelligence services of several European states, while the US 
was pushing into closer co-operation in the hope of exerting influence in a region 
where it formerly had few political, and intelligence, assets.  TRIDENT was also 
supported to some extent by the intelligence services of France, which at the time was 
embroiled in the civil war in Algeria, since Algerian rebels were supplied and trained 
by Egypt and other Arab states. 
 
TRIDENT institutionalised many aspects of the exchange of information between its 
member services.  On the macro level, the agreement gave the political legitimisation 
for the framework, which was directed by semi-annual meetings of the service chiefs, 
to co-ordinate policy and priorities.  But the real process of institutionalisation was 
conducted on the meso level - the everyday work of the various agencies, which 
created standard forms of communications and assigned liaison officers, enabling 
members of one organisation to have access to services, technology or training 
facilities of another.
18  Although its level of intensity fluctuated, intelligence 
cooperation under TRIDENT was maintained until the 1979 revolution in Iran, and 
made a distinct contribution towards closer security relations between the 
participating countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
 
2.2 Kilowatt 
 
  16In the early 1970’s the activities of international terrorism increased dramatically in 
Western Europe.  At a secret conference conducted in the Badawi refugee camp in 
Lebanon in May 1971, representatives of terrorist groups from all over Europe met to 
co-ordinate activities and targets.  The main working principle agreed upon at Badawi 
was to have members of one terror group carry out terror attacks in other states, to foil 
police efforts that would concentrate on local groups.  This agreement brought about 
several spectacular terrorist coups, including the kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers in 
Vienna (1975), the hijacking of planes to Entebbe (1976) and Mogadishu (1977), as 
well as numerous assassinations of leading political and economic figures in Germany 
and Spain.
19 
 
In response to the new threat of international terrorism, a new multilateral intelligence 
framework was formed, code named KILOWATT.  KILOWATT was the first truly 
European intelligence forum, comprising representatives of intelligence services from 
Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Israel.
20  Its main purpose was to provide exchange of 
information on the activities of Palestinian and international terrorists.  Few details 
are available on the activities of KILOWATT, but intelligence sources confirmed that 
the multilateral exchange of information through KILOWATT was an effective tool 
in reducing the level of terrorist activities in Western Europe in the late 1970’s.
21  
From what little information available it seems that KILOWATT was not based on a 
macro-level formal treaty, but rather an expansion of meso-level bilateral 
arrangements, which began as early as 1972 on a bilateral basis, into a multilateral 
framework. 
 
  17Even less is known about the activities of MEGATONNE, reported as a framework 
for sharing intelligence on the activities of radical Islamic terrorists in Europe
22.  
MEGATTONE was apparently sponsored by France and aimed mainly at countering 
the threat of Islamic Algerian terrorists in the European mainland, activities that 
escalated in the early 1990s.  One of MEGATTONE’s successes was reported to be 
the arrest of the terrorist Ali Hamade at Frankfurt airport in January 1987. 
 
Two more cooperation frameworks are included in this analysis although one was not 
strictly an arrangement between intelligence services but rather more a political and 
law-enforcement structure.  These are the Trevi Group and the Brenner Club. 
 
2.3 Trevi 
 
The Trevi Group was officially formed at a meeting of EC Ministers of Justice and 
Internal Affairs in Luxembourg, in June 1976.  At the height of international terror 
activities in Europe, EC member states sought to create a formal framework for police 
cooperation within Europe.  The agreement reached established a multinational body 
within the EC, but not part of any EC structure and over which the European 
Commission did not exert any significant influence, to co-ordinate and enhance police 
cooperation in specific matters of common interest and against common threats.
23 
 
On the macro level, Trevi was presided over by an official nominated by the EC 
member-state holding the current ordinary EC presidency, which rotated every six 
months.  Its highest forum was regular half-yearly meeting of EC Ministers of Internal 
Affairs.  A secretariat for Trevi was drawn from the state holding the presidency, 
which was responsible for organising the ministerial meetings.  But the real power of 
  18Trevi lay in its so-called ‘Group’ - a forum of delegations from all twelve EC member 
states that comprised senior government officials and police officers.  It was with this 
meso-level ‘Trevi Group of Senior Officials’ that Trevi’s real power lay, since could 
convene working groups dealing with various specific issues of concern and issuing 
recommendations for action by the member states.  The experts in the various 
working groups pooled their knowledge and experience and proposed workable, 
practical solutions to current problems. 
 
Trevi formed four working groups; the first two were established in 1977, one to 
exchange information on terrorism, the second to examine wider issues of police 
cooperation such as public order, language difficulties, training etc.  The issue of 
terrorism was closely linked to the ongoing counter-terrorist activities of intelligence 
services, and brought Trevi into contact with various intelligence agencies in Europe.  
Informal working patterns evolved out of these relations, which had direct bearing on 
Trevi’s later work.  A third working group was formed in 1985, to deal with 
cooperation over serious crime, defined mainly as drug-trafficking and organised 
crime, but also including computer crime, money laundering and crime analysis.
24  On 
the micro level, Trevi was successful in brining together officials and officers from 
different participating countries for cooperation over specific cases. 
 
A forth working group, known as ‘Trevi 1992’, was initiated in 1988 to examine the 
consequences of abolishing internal border controls within the EU.  The findings of 
this group formed the base for the 1990 Trevi Programme of Action, proposing 
measures to counter new threats of cross-border crime.
25  Many of Trevi’s 
recommendations were implemented by the member states, the most important of 
  19which being the establishment of National Drugs Intelligence Units.  In several 
countries, including Britain and Italy, this unit formed a precedent as the first time 
outside the investigation of terrorism that information collected by different regional 
and local police forces was pooled together and available centrally on the national 
level.  Trevi later posted Drugs Liaison Officers (DLO’s) to countries outside Europe, 
to assist in assembling and disseminating information over drugs trafficking in 
producer countries throughout this new network of national police intelligence units.
26  
Trevi’s work formed the base upon which the German proposals for the creation of 
Europol, first circulated in 1991, were formed.  After 1992 Trevi was integrated into 
the EU structure under a new name, the ‘Co-ordination Committee for Justice and 
Internal Affairs (K-4)’ and its functions expanded to regulation proposals over law 
enforcement and intelligence issues, including the interception of communications, 
information databases and privacy. 
 
This trend of combining intelligence services and traditional law enforcement 
agencies against international crime was strengthened by intelligence legislation in 
many European countries, notably Britain and Germany
27.  This legislation brought 
the intelligence services, previously limited to activities in the political and military 
fields, into the forefront of European law enforcement activities against international 
organised crime.  Even the European Commission, which for many years avoided 
dealing with the issue of intelligence services, realised the potential of intelligence 
cooperation in countering crime that affects the economic interests of the EU. The 
Commission has established a link to intelligence services via ‘Directorate F’ of the 
Secretariat General, which deals with fraud prevention
28.  
 
  20On the meso and micro levels, the strength of Trevi lay in its membership, a closed 
circle of officials from similar services following a common, though far from similar, 
agenda.  The semi-secret nature of Trevi, as well as the ‘distance’ it maintained from 
the more open European institutions, enabled policy issues to be discussed and 
information shared in an informal and professional atmosphere, relatively 
disconnected from everyday political squabbles.  Although Trevi-assigned officials 
represented, of course, the will and interests of their governments, the Trevi 
framework nevertheless succeeded in establishing numerous working norms and 
established ‘ground rules’ for intelligence exchange and cooperation.  These norms 
and rules paved the way for the development of EUROPOL and the extensive law 
enforcement cooperation under the EU Third Pillar of today. 
 
2.4  The ‘Brenner Club’ 
 
The Brenner Club is a cooperation framework among Western European internal 
security services.  It is based on periodical meetings attended by the heads of the 
relevant security services, including the German BfV, the British MI-5, the French 
internal security services and those of other European countries.  Although lacking a 
permanent secretariat or common offices, it is nevertheless a resilient framework that 
brings together heads and senior officials from internal security services of many 
countries, sharing common security interests and targets.  The Brenner Club operates 
in an informal way, with meetings being conducted in different locations and 
organised by each host country in turn.  In recent years meetings of the Brenner Club 
dealt with a range of internal security issues including terrorism, illegal immigration 
and cross boundary forms of organised crime.
29 
 
  21The above sections examined past and present intelligence cooperation frameworks.  
The following chapter examines NATO potential intelligence requirements from such 
cooperation at four phases. 
 
3  Variables and parameters for NATO-Med Intelligence Cooperation  
 
This chapter examines the wide range of variables and parameters influencing NATO-
Med intelligence cooperation.  These variables and parameters are divided into six 
main categories, with each category presenting a specific policy area relevant to 
decision-making.  The purpose of this analysis is to examine problem areas and 
potential friction points which needs addressing if NATO is to expand its intelligence 
cooperation with Mediterranean countries.  The parameters examined will dictate or 
influence the level and type of cooperation formed. 
 
3.1  Overall political situation 
 
The first consideration to be taken into account when planning intelligence 
cooperation is the overall political situation.  Bilateral and multilateral relations, both 
inside the Mediterranean region and with the NATO member states would feature 
prominently in such analysis.  However, since NATO is a multinational organisation 
its operations tended to be based on coalitions comprising both NATO and non-
NATO states.  The experience of the past decade, and especially in former 
Yugoslavia, Albania and Macedonia demonstrates the importance of two key 
characteristics in coalitions: its composition and previous experience with the relevant 
country. 
3.1.1  Composition of coalitions 
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level and type of intelligence cooperation with non-NATO potential partner states.  A 
coalition would not essentially mean in this case the entire membership of NATO but 
rather those member states directly involved in military operations.  First, the 
presence of countries sponsoring, or opposing, potential Mediterranean partner states 
would encourage or preclude such cooperation, respectively.  For example, 
cooperation with Cyprus could be dependant on the participation of Greece, as a 
sponsor, or of Turkey, as opposition.  Active participation of Israel could adversely 
affect the willingness of Arab Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt, to cooperate 
closer on intelligence matters with NATO.  
3.1.2  Previous experience with partner country 
 
Previous experience in intelligence and security cooperation could have a direct affect 
on the level of potential cooperation for the future.  While this may sound rather 
obvious, previous experience is not always a determinant for political cooperation.  
Indeed, political changes could bring about radical changes in political willingness to 
cooperate.  Such was the case, for example, with Serbia, which under the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic was a political outcast.  However, shortly after Milosevic’s fall 
from power security cooperation developed between the European Union and the 
newly elected Serbian government.  Yesterday’s enemies found themselves around 
one table when it came to re-establishing Serbia’s role in the Balkans. 
 
Since intelligence relations are often dependent on closely nurtured interpersonal 
relations between key officials, there is a natural reluctance to cooperate with former 
enemies.  This is especially apparent on the meso level.  A case in point would be the 
security cooperation between the Israeli intelligence services and the PLO following 
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institutional framework for this cooperation, security officials from both sides, who 
had spent a lifetime fighting one another in the shadowy war of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, found it difficult to overcome past animosities and adjust to new political 
realities
30. 
3.2  Policy directives of higher political authorities 
 
NATO as an international organisation is dependant on the policies and decisions of 
the member states and has relatively little independence in high policymaking.  The 
highest political authorities of the member states determine the policy direction 
NATO should follow, leaving the military and technical decisions to NATO’s 
international military staff.  In this regard, four key variables should be discussed: US 
policy and the dependency on US intelligence, policies of other key NATO members, 
treaties and other formal instruments, and the commitment of resources. 
3.2.1 US  policy 
 
Despite recent progress made in the intelligence capacities of the larger European 
states, the United States remains an ‘intelligence superpower’ both in terms of 
capabilities and its scope of global coverage.  Only the United States can afford the 
enormous costs of SIGINT development and procurement, including espionage 
satellites and global communication monitoring.  Any effective NATO intelligence 
cooperation with Mediterranean states would consist, to a large part, of information 
originating within the US intelligence community.  Therefore, the goodwill of US 
intelligence services and above all that of the CIA would be crucial for the 
development of effective intelligence cooperation frameworks. 
3.2.2  Policies of other main intelligence powers in coalition 
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the time frame for obtaining intelligence information is very short and the military 
requirements at their widest.  However, during peacetime or even pre-conflict phases, 
European intelligence services could still enhance multilateral intelligence exchange 
through their close contacts with specific services in the Mediterranean region.   
Almost each of the larger European intelligence services enjoy some forms of ‘special 
relations’ with equivalent services in the Mediterranean and could use those relations 
to push forward for expanded participation, and resources, being put into intelligence 
cooperation frameworks. 
3.2.3  Treaties and agreements 
 
Existing treaties or agreements could influence or restrict intelligence cooperation 
with Mediterranean countries if they deal with the extent of information sharing.  The 
UKUSA agreement, for example, establishes a global framework for Sigint 
intelligence exchange between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand
31.  However, much of the UKUSA output is restricted to its members and 
may not be shared with others without the agreement of the other participants, some 
of whom are not NATO members.  In a similar way, any existing treaties or 
agreements within NATO dealing with intelligence sharing could restrict external 
intelligence cooperation and thus need to be addressed before wider cooperation with 
Mediterranean states could become a viable policy option. 
3.2.4  Commitment of resources 
 
Beyond political and official goodwill, intelligence cooperation requires the 
commitment of resources.  These resources include funds, equipment, training and 
personnel.  Although in relation to their potential benefits at times of conflict these 
costs are relatively low, experience with the development of NATO’s Mediterranean 
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at NATO planning and financial allocations.  Obtaining the required information 
through intelligence cooperation is very often much cheaper than developing the 
capacity to obtain it independently.  Of course, independent collection capabilities 
free NATO from having to pay a certain political price, but from an economic point of 
view, intelligence cooperation is a cheap and fast way of expanding intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
3.3  Professional level of non-NATO intelligence services 
 
The professional level of non-NATO intelligence services considered as potential 
cooperation partners exerts a significant influence on possible cooperation.  As one 
former senior intelligence official bluntly stated “nobody wants to cooperate with 
partners who are no good at it”
32.  Militarily, NATO would strive to cooperate with 
those services having the capability to assist NATO operations in the region.   
However, cooperation with weaker services, while perhaps not of immedtate 
intelligence value, could improve political relations and would also have a much 
higher impact on enhancing the capabilities of those partner services to a point where 
they, too, could be militarily useful. 
3.3.1  Level of operational capabilities 
 
The level of operational capabilities refers, at its most basic level, to the ability of 
intelligence services to obtain required information or achieve other policy targets.  In 
the Mediterranean, the levels of operational capabilities differ markedly from country 
to country and from service to service.  Some services are highly capable, possessing 
dedicated personnel and the required infrastructure for operations abroad.  Other 
services, more concerned with internal security or the propping up of an undemocratic 
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their external capabilities. 
3.3.2  Level of reliability 
 
The level of reliability refers to the ability of specific services to keep information 
security.  It is a sad fact that during the Cold War, numerous NATO secrets were 
compromised through the espionage activities of the Soviet Union and its recruitment 
of agents within NATO itself.  Penetration of a rival intelligence service is one of the 
highest targets for espionage.  In order to ensure the physical security of information 
provided, NATO officials must be convinced that a potential cooperating partner 
maintains a high level of reliability with regard to its personnel, physical facilities and 
communications.  The NATO Office of Security, responsible for security and 
counterespionage inside NATO, could play together with national-level services an 
active role in evaluating the level of reliability maintained by potential Mediterranean 
partner services. 
3.4  Reaction of opposition in target country 
 
The reaction of the political opposition in each potential Mediterranean cooperation 
partner is crucial for the success of intelligence cooperation.  While a political 
decision to cooperate with NATO over intelligence matters could often be kept away 
from public knowledge through media censorship, political norms may call for 
informing the parliamentary opposition of such a policy
33.  Even if not informed 
officially, opposition parties often have their own sources within intelligence services 
and such cooperation would be almost impossible to keep away from their 
knowledge.  Thought should therefore must be given to analysing the possible impact 
of such cooperation on the internal politics of the partner country, including the 
reaction of the opposition and that of the media. 
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The above sections examined issues and potential friction points in NATO-
Mediterranean intelligence cooperation.  The following chapter examines NATO’s 
intelligence requirements in the region at four different phases of policy. 
 
4  NATO Intelligence Requirements in the Mediterranean – Four 
Phases of Cooperation 
 
NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation could be divided into four time 
phases, each representing a policy situation.  Each phase is characterised by distinct 
intelligence requirements, which influence cooperation substance and form.   The 
different requirements and working parameters for each phase are presented within 
potential cooperation with Mediterranean non-member countries. 
 
4.1 Peacetime  phase 
 
During peacetime, the main requirement of an intelligence cooperation framework is 
to develop solid relations, expand political and administrative goodwill and develop 
the mechanisms that could be put into affect during times of crisis.  Peacetime 
intelligence cooperation often tends to be neglected, due to the perception that 
cooperation over specific, pressing issues is not really required at that time.       
However, peacetime could be just the right time to plan ahead and create long-tern 
goodwill that could be later turned into hard intelligence assets.  It is also much easier 
to reach agreement over operational issues through the nessecary contacts and 
negotiations without the pressing time constraints of crisis. 
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parameters for operational exchange.  It should thus concentrate on defining a set of 
requirements for cooperation with services outside NATO.  These requirements 
include issues of communication, liaison, security clearance, information 
classification and information security. 
 
4.2 Pre-conflict  phase 
 
The pre-conflict phase indicates a time span where military action becomes a viable 
policy option.  The pre-conflict phase is often used for extensive political negotiations 
but also for coalition building, ensuring that a military operation can be mounted 
quickly and effectively. 
 
From an intelligence point of view, pre-conflict time is a time of hectic activity.   
Intelligence deficiencies are quickly recognised and must be made good.  New 
information is required on issues, political groups, leaders or military forces that may 
not have been previously considered to be of key importance.  The pre-conflict phase 
is usually when officials and politicians become interested in the issue of intelligence 
cooperation.  As the threat of military hostilities grow, friends are sought very quickly 
in an attempt to make up for lack of planning or for weak regional capabilities.  The 
pre-conflict phase is also characterised by a high willingness to commit resources to 
intelligence cooperation, not only for gaining information but also as a political 
goodwill gesture. 
 
The main type of intelligence required at the pre-conflict phase is political 
intelligence.  Often this information is required to support negotiation or mediation 
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side and the positions of key individuals in the rival state or states.  Personal and even 
psychological analysis of leaders can assist in estimating their reaction to specific 
policy options or crises.  Such analysis was, for example, performed on Saddam 
Hussein after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 to determine his attitude towards 
the use of chemical weapons against coalition forces.  
 
Beyond political intelligence, a wide range of military information is required at this 
phase to gage the enemy’s ability to attack or withstand an attack.  Enemy order of 
battle, force dispositions, air defences, troop moral, logistical infrastructure and 
communications would be of high priorities for the NATO military staff in planning 
possible scenarios and operations. 
  
4.3 Conflict  phase 
 
Once armed hostilities commence, not only the type of intelligence required but also 
the timeframe for obtaining it change dramatically.  Military operations require a wide 
range of intelligence information directly related to the application of force, and this 
information must be available on very short notice.  Since enemy positions, plans and 
operations are liable to change constantly during a campaign, intelligence must be 
updated regularly and reliably throughout the conflict phase. 
 
Conflict phase is a test case for previous intelligence cooperation conducted at a more 
serene pace.  NATO forces operating in the Mediterranean region require information 
on the order of battle of local forces, their positions and strength, troops moral, 
logistics and supplies, command structure, plans, communication methods and last but 
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comprehensive intelligence picture in the region would be almost impossible to 
achieve without close cooperation with non-NATO intelligence services in the region 
that enjoy a high level of country-region specialisation. 
 
The NATO campaign in Kosovo illustrated the effectiveness of an aerial campaign 
when NATO forces enjoy air superiority.  However, the success of such a campaign 
depends on accurate target location and identification.  This element is especially 
important due to public opinion sensitivity over civilian casualties and attacks 
directed against wrong targets.  The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade by error demonstrated how targeting error could become a public 
embarrassment and a policy impediment.  Cooperation with local intelligence services 
could assist in accurate target identification and location as well as damage 
assessments. 
 
Beyond military information, such cooperation could also assist in humanitarian 
issues.  Information relating to the situation of refugees and civilians could be critical 
to mission success.  This was amply demonstrated during the first weeks of the 
Kosovo campaign, as NATO strove to obtain information over the fate of hundred of 
thousand of Albanian refugees in Kosovo driven from their homes by the Serb forces.  
Intelligence services in the region, mainly through the use of human sources, could 
complement NATO’s SIGINT and aerial/satellite monitoring activities regarding the 
plight of civilians in the conflict zones. 
 
4.4  Post-conflict and Peace-building phase 
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to information requirements aimed at enhancing peace efforts.  These efforts include 
the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, treaty verification, collection of weapons, 
mine clearing, construction of infrastructure damaged during the fighting, refugee 
relief and re-establishing political and civil society institutions. 
 
These peace-building activities require intelligence efforts that could become crucial 
to the stability of political settlements.  Although post-conflict intelligence 
requirements carry a lower intensity and urgency than during the conflict, they 
nevertheless augment political and economic peace-building efforts. 
 
A special issue in the post-conflict phase is the investigation of war crimes and the 
prosecution of war criminals.  The establishment of the International War Crimes 
Tribunal in The Hague has illustrated the importance attached to this issue by NATO, 
which assisted in apprehending some of the most wanted people on the Tribunal’s list.  
The investigation of war crimes is not only limited to forensic investigations at the 
crime scenes but goes deeper into the political and military leadership of a conflict, 
the conduct of politicians and commanders in the field, structure of command, 
unwritten orders and understandings.  Such investigations could benefit enormously 
from cooperation of regional intelligence services with deep knowledge not only of 
the location of potential war criminals but also of the way the enemy was operating. 
 
However, the investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive issue for intelligence 
services that may perceive that policy as a double-edged sword.  War crimes are often 
perceived as the ‘victor’s justice’ and intelligence services which may themselves 
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ultimately, expose wrongdoings within their own ranks as well.  The wide media 
exposure of war crimes trials in The Hague illustrate the public importance attached 
to this issue, which will very likely keep it at the top of post-conflict efforts for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
An additional issue relating to war crimes is the theft of national heritage and art 
treasures, the identification of looted assets and illegal war gains.  Without 
intelligence cooperation it would be almost impossible to trace the movement of 
funds, art works and other looted treasures in a post-conflict phase.  In order to 
combat the theft of art and national heritage treasures, the European Commission, in 
cooperation with INTERPOL’s Art Division and many West and East European 
police forces, created a special ‘Art Loss Register’.  The Art Loss Register lists 
thousands of art works reported as stolen in Eastern Europe.  Auction houses, dealers 
and private individuals can trace through the Register the official ownership of a 
specific piece of art on offer and thus prevent it being sold within the EU.  As a 
further measure against the movement and sale of such stolen art works, the EU 
Directive of 1993 requires art works identified as stolen to be returned to their original 
owners, provided they were classified as ‘National Treasures’, with a limitation for 
claims being 30 years
34.  The work of the Register, together with investigations 
carried out for the International War Crimes Tribunal, could enable the return of 
looted assets to their owners and for the benefit of the public. 
 
NATO’s supervision of the disarming of the Albanian UCK organisation in the 
autumn of 2001 demonstrated the value of local intelligence not only for war but also 
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assist in monitoring cease-fire agreements and verification of treaties.  It also has a 
role to play in NATO post-conflict humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, similar to 
those carried out in the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo. 
 
The above sections examine intelligence requirements that could be addressed by 
cooperation with intelligence services in the Mediterranean.  The following chapter 
examines practical ways by which NATO-Mediterranean intelligence cooperation 
could be enhanced. 
 
5  Policy Options for Enhancing NATO-Med intelligence Cooperation 
 
The previous chapter examined policy limitations and operational characteristics 
affecting Euro-Med intelligence cooperation.  This chapter aims to build upon this 
analysis and present a series of concrete policy options for enhancing and expanding 
effective Euro-Med intelligence cooperation.  These policy options were defined 
through discussions with numerous experts, former intelligence officials and civil 
servants in the field of security.  Many of the suggestions were followed up by input 
from other sources, pointing out advantages of deficiencies of each approach.  These 
policy options are not aimed at presenting a ‘turn-key’ approach to enhancing 
cooperation but rather to stimulate discussion and creative policy initiatives.  The 
policy options discussed in the following sections present a crystallisation of a much 
larger number of individual initiatives proposed by different persons, each aimed at 
solving particular problems of enhancing specific issues in the Euro-Med intelligence 
cooperation. 
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they present a way forward towards an intelligence cooperation framework resilient 
enough to function on a long-term basis through common interests.  Although the 
recent massive terror attacks against the United States amply demonstrate the wide 
variety of national interests at play in Middle East security policy-making, an 
intelligence cooperation framework does not depend wholly on a common threat.   
Rather it is aimed at creating long-term cooperation in key areas of intelligence, 
which can be capitalised upon during times of crisis or conflict.  As such, it should be 
considered a long-term policy asset rather than an arrangement for immediate results.  
The development of mutual institutional confidence and trust, personal relationships 
between key officials, regular meetings and standardised communications would 
make a significant contribution to the security interests of Europe.  The following 
sections present policy options for enhancing such a framework by establishing 
different initiatives that would help develop the institutional basis for future 
cooperation. 
 
5.1  Intelligence Liaison Officers 
 
Past experience in multinational intelligence cooperation illustrates the value of 
permanent liaison officers stationed at other countries.  Assigning NATO officers as 
military representatives to Mediterranean countries could be a step perceived by many 
as an attempt to create NATO policy away from that of the individual member states.  
The issue of stationing such intelligence liaison officers inside NATO member-state 
embassies could also create political problems.  However, the problematic nature of 
permanent in-place representation could be overcome by assigning NATO 
intelligence liaison officers to individual Mediterranean countries that would not be 
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could often visit their country of assignment, creating and enhancing personal contact 
with the relevant officials and authorities, while avoiding the problematic need to be 
based permanently at a foreign capital. 
 
5.2  Participation in PfP Initiatives 
 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) aims to enhance the relations between NATO 
and the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Beyond its political 
functions, the PfP brings together military officials and personnel from the 
participating countries to participate in a wide range of NATO training courses and 
study programmes.  The participation of East European officers side by side with 
those of the NATO member countries not only enables the acquirement of skills and 
training but also greatly contributes to goodwill, understanding and personal 
relationships.  The PfP courses are funded by NATO’s regular budget and cover a 
wide range of topics and military skills, ranging from strategy to logistics, 
maintenance and troops welfare.  Many experts point out that participation in PfP 
courses and programmes is highly sought after in Eastern European armed forces, and 
the participants in the courses often gain advantage in their promotion over others 
with little or no knowledge of NATO. 
 
5.3  Mediterranean Intelligence College 
 
Intelligence as a profession requires a lengthy period of training and education. 
Training and professional education in the field of intelligence are usually carried out 
by dedicated institutions belonging to the intelligence services on the national level. 
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could encourage joint intelligence training which could not only imparts operational 
skills and methods but also establish organizational culture and working norms. This 
so-called 'service culture' influences the way intelligence professionals perceive the 
role of their service in society, their attitude towards political control, and the way 
they perceive regional and global security issues. 
 
NATO has long since recognized the importance of joint training and officer 
education.  By bringing together young intelligence practitioners of different 
nationalities and services but with similar jobs or responsibilities, not only is future 
cooperation enhanced but also a common 'culture of cooperation' develops.  Such 
training and education create networks of personal relationships that often go way 
beyond the professional level.  Often junior officers from different nations who attend 
NATO educational or training programs remain in contact for many years the to as 
they advanced through their careers.  These interpersonal relationships play an 
important role in maintaining goodwill not only on the political level but also among 
security officials directly concerned with intelligence cooperation. 
 
5.4  Standardisation of Communications 
 
Effective communications are a key to successful cooperation.  Intelligence 
cooperation frameworks require the communication infrastructure that would enable 
regular, efficient and secure communications between the cooperating partners.  The 
standardisation of communications between NATO and potential Mediterranean 
intelligence partners is a requirement for long-term effective relations.  While ad-hoc 
intelligence problems could be solved by existing communication methods, dedicated 
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transfer of information, in a format that would fit existing NATO modes of operation. 
 
In developing NATO-Med intelligence cooperation frameworks, two approaches 
could be taken towards the issue of communications.  The first would be to 
incorporate these frameworks into standard NATO communication networks. The 
second would be to develop dedicated communication networks for the purpose of 
external intelligence cooperation. 
 
The first approach would be easy and relatively cheap, but carries a potential security 
risk in exposing NATO secure communications channels to external bodies outside 
the alliance.  The second approach, that of dedicated communication channels, would 
entail adapting existing standards to external communication channels.  NATO 
already possesses systems that could be adopted for such purposes.  The development 
of NATO’s Joint Operation Information and Intelligence System (JOIIS) is seen as a 
milestone in the progress of intelligence information systems.  JOIIS, used by SFOR 
in Bosnia, processes information in a standard way, making it available for a 
multitude of tasks and decision-making processes.  NATO’s Command Control and 
Consultation Center (NC3A) in Denhagen has a successful history of developing 
computer systems tailor-made for NATO’s strategic and tactical requirement.  These 
developments include, for example, the DARE (Data Access/Retrieval for Entities) 
computer system for the use of SFOR site inspectors
35.  Similar development could be 
applicable for NATO external intelligence cooperation, presenting the information in 
a format instantly usable by NATO. 
 
  385.5 Information  Security 
 
Most of the intelligence material going through NATO channels is highly 
confidential.  Indeed much of it, while made available to officials of the various 
member states, is marked as not for distribution outside the Alliance (“NONFOR”).  
Intelligence information is provided by member state intelligence services on the 
understanding that it will not be provided to countries outside the Alliance, possibly 
risking sources and methods.  Much of the concern of member state intelligence 
services is that security at the services of non-members is lower or not as efficient as 
that of NATO, making a possible leak of secret information more likely or possible.  
Herman notes that “all (intelligence) organizations have the usual institutional 
conviction that no-one else’s work is as reliable as their own”.
36 
 
The issue of information security is a crucial one in intelligence cooperation.  Secrets 
would only be provided if the provider were convinced they would remain secret.  
Every exchange of secrets could threaten the security of intelligence sources, and 
intelligence chiefs are reluctant to trust new cooperation partners until their reliability 
has been proven over a period of time.  This is especially valid for exchanges with 
countries of unstable regimes, where change of government could lead to intelligence 
secrets being made public.
37 
 
The issue of information security and integrity could be addressed on a level that 
would enable countries participating in the PfP or Mediterranean Dialogue access to 
some forms of NATO material, upon the understanding that it would not be provided 
to any third party.  The development of intelligence cooperation frameworks would 
depend on developing effective systems of information classification acceptable on 
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endorse, the personnel vetting practices and security clearances of potential 
cooperation partner intelligence services.  NATO could, of course, outline basic 
guidelines for information security, personnel vetting and security clearances.  But it 
would be up to the cooperation partner services to implement those guidelines and to 
NATO to have confidence in such an implementation.  Such confidence is built over 
an extended period of time but is not impossible to achieve. 
 
5.6  Information on NATO 
 
A paramount barrier towards effective and open cooperation with NATO is the 
inherent suspicion which exists within official security and intelligence circles in 
many Mediterranean Arab countries, especially some of the smaller ones, towards 
NATO and its political agenda in the region.  This suspicion is based on the belief that 
NATO policy is a clear manifestation of Christian European values and follows some 
hidden agenda against Muslim states.  Such beliefs were popular during the first half 
of the 1990s but declined significantly following the Kosovo campaign, where NATO 
forces set out to defend the Albanian Muslim population.  However, even though 
NATO seemed to follow a ‘pro-Muslim’ line in Kosovo, the military campaign 
against Serbia was perceived by many in the Arab world as foreign intervention 
demonstrating the military weakness of small countries against the modern military 
might of a united Europe. 
 
Suspicion towards NATO and its political and religious agendas often rise due to lack 
of clear understanding as to NATO’s structure, mandate and decision-making 
mechanisms.  Peacetime intelligence cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean 
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ground for open cooperation.  Visits by NATO officials to the headquarters of 
Mediterranean intelligence services and visits of Mediterranean officials at NATO 
Headquarters and SHAPE could go a long way towards disseminating information on 
NATO and eradicating prejudices.  Effort should also be expanded at providing 
information on NATO structure and missions to intelligence and political officials, 
especially at the smaller Mediterranean countries.  The provision of such information, 
coupled with visits to NATO facilities, could go a long way towards allying the 
suspicions expressed in official circles towards NATO. 
5.7  Training and Education 
 
Another area where cooperation could be developed during peacetime is the field of 
training and officer education.  Under NATO’s Mediterranean Partnership, military 
officers from Mediterranean countries are invited to participate in a range of NATO 
training courses.  This participation could be expanded to intelligence officials, who 
could be invited to attend existing NATO courses, conducted at various NATO 
education facilities, including Oberamergau, Rome etc.  
 
The importance of participation in multinational training courses and study programs 
goes beyond the acquisition of personal skills and information.  NATO experience 
amply demonstrates that the participation of officers from many different nations in 
joint training courses or study programs create personal relationships between 
officials, relations which often later turn into expanded goodwill and cooperation.  
Relations on a personal level are highly important in the intelligence field, where the 
success of active cooperation is often dependant on mutual trust and reliability.   
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intelligence officials could be incorporated into special intelligence liaison courses.  
Those could also include intelligence officials from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
countries in Eastern Europe, thus creating an even wider base for interpersonal 
interaction and future relations. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Despite the euphoria that accompanied the 1993 Oslo Accords and the end of the civil 
war in former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean region remains an area characterised by 
political instability and conflicts.  It is also the arena of NATO’s first-ever conflict 
region military operations.  NATO forces are stationed at various areas in the Balkans 
in an attempt to stabilise peace and regional security.  The Mediterranean is a 
potential theatre of operations for NATO and the alliance’s intelligence posture in the 
regional should be strengthened. 
 
Intelligence cooperation is one way of expanding intelligence capabilities in this 
difficult region.  By enhancing such cooperation, NATO would not only be gaining 
strategic assets and increasing its intelligence collection capabilities but would also 
make a significant contribution towards regional stability and security.  Through the 
commitment of political will and resources, this intelligence cooperation could assist 
NATO in bridging its intelligence information gap over the Mediterranean. 
 
This study examined the development of intelligence cooperation frameworks, which 
served the security interests of the countries involved.  In a world where security is 
measured by knowledge and not only by numbers of tanks or aircraft, not only 
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between intelligence services.  These services provide information for decision-
makers and are therefore in a position to influence policy, directly or indirectly.   
 
Closer contacts between NATO and the intelligence services of individual 
Mediterranean states could also lead to better intelligence relations within the 
Mediterranean region itself.  This element could be crucial for effective action against 
terrorism.  While it is too early to assess the impact of the recent wave of radical 
Islamic terrorism on NATO, the alliance did declare it an ‘Article 5’ attack, the first-
ever in NATO’s history.  NATO intelligence must adapt its range of sources and 
partners to provide the required information against this new and deadly threat. 
 
External intelligence cooperation could serve peace as much as war.  New forms of 
information are required to support NATO’s expanding range of peacekeeping efforts.  
Recent events in Macedonia demonstrated the need for extensive preparedness if such 
efforts are to bolster long-term political changes.  As intelligence services are moving 
from being weapons of war towards also serving peace, the role of intelligence 
cooperation will expand as NATO plans forward to facing new potential challenges in 
the Mediterranean region.   
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